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Abstract
Using U.S. cross-sectional data, this paper calculates the welfare cost of a 10% in-
ﬂation for diﬀerent individuals and ﬁnds that the diﬀerence in cost between the poorest
10%, measured by their expenditure share on cash goods, and the richest 10% is in the
order of 176%. That is, a poor person is on average willing to forgive 176% more of
their total consumption in order to have inﬂation reduced from 10% to 0. In absolute
terms this represents a cost of 2.687% of consumption for the poorest and 0.974% for
the richest. I accomplish this by introducing preference heterogeneity in a monetary
search model ﬁrst developed by Lagos and Wright (2005), and calibrate the model to
match the expenditure share on cash goods and total expenditures for each individual
type using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the second quarter
of 1996. I also show that this welfare diﬀerence increases to 210% (10.522% for the
poorest 10% and 3.401% for the richest 10%) whenever frictions in the use of money
are imposed (holdup problem). The ability to explicitly model these frictions is the
advantage of using this model. Hence, inﬂation in this framework, as other studies
have shown, acts as a regressive consumption tax; and this regressiveness is augmented
with the holdup problem.
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1 Introduction
The topic of welfare cost of inﬂation has been extensively studied in economics. The
idea that holding money has an opportunity cost given by some interest forgone was
ﬁrst introduced by Bailey (1956). Bailey gave the metric for which one could derive
how much inﬂation reduces welfare by calculating the area under an inverse money
demand curve between some positive interest rate and zero. This area, known as
Bailey's triangle, measures the ineﬃciency of carrying money whenever nominal interest
rates are positive.
Using Bailey's metric, Fischer (1981), Lucas (1981), and Lucas (2000) calculated
very small welfare costs of inﬂation for the U.S. ranging from 0.3% to 1% of income.
In these models, a maintained assumption is that markets are competitive. This is also
true in Cooley and Hansen (1989) and (1991), where, in both cases, the welfare costs
of inﬂation are less than 1%. In general, under competitive markets, most studies have
concluded that moderate inﬂation is somewhat costless. Wu and Zhang (2000) deviated
from competitive markets and have derived much larger welfare costs; in their paper
markets are monopolistically competitive.
Lagos and Wright (2005) also deviate from competitive markets by calculating the
welfare cost of inﬂation using a simple model of deep money with bilateral trading and
transactional demand for cash, where bargaining frictions are explicitly imposed. In
their paper, whenever bargaining power is shifted towards the seller (holdup problem),
moderate inﬂation creates a much larger cost. Hence, deviations from standard real
business cycle models can generate higher welfare costs of inﬂation. The importance
of their work is that welfare costs of inﬂation can be calculated in a model with micro-
foundations and no ex-ante assumptions about the use of cash; which diﬀers from cash
in advance or money in the utility function models (reduced form models).
Most of the literature, however, have ignored the possible distributional eﬀects of
inﬂation. Easterly and Fischer (2001), using pooled household data on 38 countries have
shown that inﬂation can hurt the poor more than the rich. This result suggests that
inﬂation can act as a regressive tax. Erosa and Ventura (2002), using U.S. household
data, calibrate a monetary growth model and show that inﬂation acts as a regressive
consumption tax.
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The current paper extends the work by Lagos and Wright1 (2005) by introducing
preference heterogeneity similarly to Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Martin (2005) and
calculates the welfare cost of a 10% inﬂation for each individual type. I calibrate the
model to U.S. household cross-sectional data, using the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX) for the second quarter of 1996. As with many models with heterogeneous agents
tractability becomes a problem, hence, in order to solve the model explicitly and obtain
results, I have made some simplifying assumptions about the agent's type distribution.
There are only 10 types of agents grouped by expenditure shares on cash goods.
Each group has the same number of agents and represents the 10 diﬀerent deciles in
the expenditure share distribution. Therefore, as we move from agent type 1 to type
10, the average expenditure share on cash goods increases; and since expenditure share
on cash goods is negatively correlated with income, I will assume that as agent type
increases, the poorer is the individual.
The main ﬁndings for the baseline model, where no holdup (θ = 1) and sure proba-
bility of a single coincidence meeting (σ = 0.5) are assumed, are a welfare cost to range
between 0.974%, for agent type 1, and 2.687% for agent type 10. This result shows, in
line with other studies, that inﬂation acts as a regressive tax on consumption. When
I include the holdup problem (θ = 0.5), the welfare cost increases, as in LW(2005), to
range between 3.401% and 10.522% for those same individuals mentioned above. In
relative terms this represents a welfare cost of inﬂation 176% higher for the poorest
individuals using the baseline model, and 210% whenever the holdup is imposed.
The facts that the holdup eﬀect increases welfare cost and that inﬂation acts as a
regressive consumption tax are not new in the literature. The contribution of this paper
is that it combines these two results in a deep model of money. Also, it shows that the
regressiveness of the inﬂation tax is augmented in the presence of the holdup problem.
In order to obtain my results, I had to use the data and assume which goods were
most likely purchased with cash; hence the basket of cash goods used in this paper
was: food consumed at and away from home, alcoholic beverages, apparel, gas and
motor oil, prescription drugs, fees and admissions to entertainment events, tobacco and
smoking supplies, personal care items, and cash contributions. This assumption makes
the aggregate expenditure share on cash goods equal to 0.32, which is larger than the
1The remaining of this paper will refer to Lagos and Wright (2005) as LW(2005).
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expenditure share found in LW(2005) of about 0.10. This might seem inconsistent;
however, LW(2005) never use disaggregated data to match expenditure share on cash
goods; the value of 0.10 is obtained after the model has been solved using U.S. ag-
gregate data. To make my model comparable to LW(2005) at the aggregate level, I
have calculated the welfare cost of inﬂation for an atomistic agent matching the same
expenditure share as in LW(2005). My results are very similar to theirs.
Also, I recalculated the welfare costs using a smaller goods basket (food consumption
only), which changes the quantitative results of the model since aggregate expenditure
share on cash goods decreases, and found all results to match qualitatively. It is good
to notice that by only using food consumption as cash goods, I am underestimating
the fraction of consumption purchased with cash (in the data, aggregate expenditure
share on food is 0.19) making these results very conservative. I believe that my original
choice of basket is closer, if not still smaller, to the actual expenditure share on cash
goods by the average American.
Support to the assumption of cash goods consumption can be found on Avery et al.
(1987), Kennickell et al. (1997), and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000), where they
conclude that a somewhat large fraction of households do not own a checking account
or do not have credit cards. According to Evans and Schmalensee (2005), less than 25%
of all consumer expenditures were purchased with credit; this number decreases to less
than 15% for the data period studied in this paper. Hence, having individuals interact
in a market where only cash is accepted does not constitute a bad assumption here.
The remainder of the paper will be organized in the following matter: ﬁrst, I will
present the model with its set up, interior equilibrium, and solution; second, the model
will discuss the data used for calibration, which is the third part; fourth, results will be
presented; and the last part will bring the concluding remarks.
2 The Model
This model is a variation of the model in LW(2005) extended by Bhattacharya, Haslag
and Martin (2005). Here, agents are allowed to diﬀer with respect to the degree to
which they prefer one good over another. As in LW(2005) there will be two types of
goods; the day good or cash good and the night good or general good.
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2.1 Set Up
Time is discrete with each period divided into 2 subperiods. As a convention these
subperiods will be called day and night. There are I types of inﬁnitely lived agents
with each type i having mass χi, where
∑I
i χi = 1, and discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
Each agent type consumes and supplies labor in both subperiods. Let xi and hi be the
consumption and labor in the day, and Xi and Hi be the consumption and labor in
the night for type i agent. Let γi be the preference heterogeneity parameter for type i
agent2. Preferences will be given by:
Ui(x, h,X,H) = γiu(xi)− c(hi) + (1− γi)κU(Xi)−Hi (1)
Where γi ∈ (0, 1), κ > 0 and u, c, U are twice continuously diﬀerentiable with
u′ > 0, c′ > 0, U ′ > 0, u′′ < 0, c′′ ≥ 0, U ′′ ≤ 0 and u(0) = c(0) = 0. Also we assume that
∃q∗i ∈ (0,∞) such that γiu′(q∗i ) = c′(q∗i ) and ∃X∗i ∈ (0,∞) such that U ′(X∗i ) = 1κ(1−γi)
with U(X∗i ) > X∗i .
The day market is decentralized with anonymous bilateral matching which gives
no scope for IOUs, making money, therefore, essential. Let α be the probability of a
meeting. The good x comes in many varieties with each agent only consuming a subset
of it. Let's assume that every agent can transform h into x one to one and that every
agent does not consume what produces.
For two agents i and j meeting in the day market, there are only four possible out-
comes that can be divided into three types of meetings with three diﬀerent probabilities.
First, they are both carrying what each other wants with probability δ, this is called a
double coincidence meeting and δ is the double coincidence probability. Second, agent
i is carrying what agent j wants but not vice versa; this is called a single coincidence
meeting and let σ be the probability for this type of meeting. Symmetrically, σ will also
be the probability for the single coincidence case in which j is carrying what i wants
but not vice versa. Third, it is possible that both agents meet but neither wants what
each other has. This is the case of a no coincidence meeting and the probability of this
event happening is (1− 2σ − δ).
2Note that γi enters the utility function in both day and night markets with opposing eﬀects. This is
done as to enable the model to match total expenditure data.
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The night market is a centralized Walrasian market where agents transform H into
X one to one and X varies across individual types. In both night and day markets,
goods are perfectly divisible and nonstorable. The only feasible trades in this economy
are barter and the exchange of x for money (m) during the day, and the exchange of X
for money (m) at night, however, this will only happen if an agent wants to consume
more than what it has produced.
One of the important features of the night market is that it resets money holdings
for every agent type. Hence, each agent i enters the day market holding mi, where mi
is perfectly divisible and storable in any quantity mi ≥ 0. However, given the type
of meeting occurred in the day market, agents of the same type may enter the night
market holding diﬀerent amounts of money. The supply of money M evolves according
to Mt = (1+ρ)Mt−1, where the government changes the money supply with lump-sum
transfers or taxes τ on individuals at the beginning of the night market. Therefore, at
time t, τ = ρMt−1.
2.2 Equilibrium
Before formally deﬁning the equilibrium in this model, one needs to characterize both
the day and night markets as well as the terms of trade for single and double coincidence
meetings in the day market. Let Ft(m˜) and Gt(m˜) be the unconditional measures of
money holdings m at time t in the day and night markets respectively. And let Fit(m˜i)
and Git(m˜i) be the conditional measures of money holdings mi of agent type i at time
t in the day and night markets respectively. That is, these distributions measures the
agent's starting money holdings at the beginning of period t (day or night) wherem ≤ m˜
for the unconditional distributions and mi ≤ m˜i for the conditional distributions. Also,
let Fi0 and Gi0 be given exogenously for all i.
Total money holdings in this economy is just the sum of all agents money holdings
and since each period is divided into two, the total amount of money carried from one
subperiod to the other has to be the same. However, the amount of money held by
each type of agent can change from one subperiod to the other, that is, in this model
money can be transferred from one type of agent to another in the same period.
One important characteristic of this model is that one can show, under certain
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conditions, that all the conditional distributions of money holdings must be degenerate
in equilibrium. This feature is what guarantees the model's tractability. Also, at the
beginning of each subperiod, Fit and Git are assumed to be given by the individual
type i. This implies that individual decisions only depend on money holdings mi.
Let Vit(mi) and Wit(mi) be the individuals value functions holding mi in both day
and night markets respectively. Let φt be the price of money in the night market, that
is, 1/φt is the nominal price of the night good.
Since we have bilateral trading, xi = hi = qit(mj , m˜) where qit is the common value
for a trade with djt(mj , m˜) being the amount of dollars the buyer pays to obtain qit.
In the expression above, mj is total money holdings of the buyer, while m˜ is total
money holdings of the seller. In double coincidence meetings, let Bit(mi, m˜) be the
payoﬀ for an agent holding mi who meets someone with m˜, that is, Bit(mi, m˜) =
u(qi)− c(qi) +Wit(mi).
The value function of agent type i beginning the day market at t is given by:
Vit(mi) = ασ
∫
γiu[qit(mi, m˜)] +Wit[mi − dt(mi), m˜]dFit(m˜) +
ασ
∫
−c[qit(m˜,mi)] +Wit[mi + dt(m˜,mi)]dFit(m˜) +
αδ
∫
Bit(mi, m˜)dFit(m˜) + (1− 2ασ − αδ)Wit(mi), (2)
where the ﬁrst term represents a single coincidence meeting with the agent being a
buyer, that is, it receives utility γiu(qi) but only takes mi−di to the night market. The
second term is also a single coincidence meeting with the agent being a seller. There,
it costs −c(qi) to produce the good, but the agent is richer at night with mi + dj . The
last two terms are the expected payoﬀs from bartering and not trading.
In the night market, the value function of agent type i at time t is:
Wit(mi) = max
Xi,Hi,m′i
(1− γi)κU(Xi)−Hi + βVit+1(m′i) (3)
subject to
Xi = Hi + φt(mi + τ)− φtm′i (4)
and Xi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ Hi ≤ H¯, m′i ≥ 0. Here H¯ represents an upper bound on possible
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hours worked. Even though the corner solution is possible here, I will follow Lagos
and Wright's (2005) approach and assume that X∗ and H∗ are interior. Lagos and
Wright have shown that 0 < H∗ < H¯ will be satisﬁed in these models under standard
conditions.
The terms of trade in this model can be characterized in the following way. In the
day market, agent i will choose the optimal di and qi to solve the generalized Nash
bargaining problem given by:
[γiu(qi) +Wit(mi − di)−Wit(mi)]θ[−c(qi) +Wit(m˜+ di)−Wit(m˜)]1−θ (5)
with di ≤ mi and qi ≥ 0, θ > 0 being the buyer's bargaining power parameter, and
threat points Wit(mi).
For double coincidence meetings, agents will solve a simple symmetric Nash bar-
gaining problem with threat points given by the continuation values Wit(mi). That is,
the agents will need to solve:
max
q1,q2,Υ
[γ1u(q1)− c(q2)− φΥ][γ2u(q2)− c(q1)− φΥ] (6)
subject to −m2 ≤ Υ ≤ m1, where Υ is the amount of money agent 1 pays agent 2, and
qi is the quantity consumed by agent i.
Hence, an equilibrium in this model can be the deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition An equilibrium in this model is a list {Vit,Wit, Xit,Hit,m′it, qit, dit, φt, Fit, Git},
where for all i and t, Vit(mi) and Wit(mi) are the value functions; Xit(mi), Hit(mi),
and m′it(mi) are decision rules in the night market; qit(mi, m˜) and dit(mi, m˜) are the
terms of trade in the day market; φt is the price of money in the night market; and Fit
and Git are the conditional distributions of money holdings in the beginning of each
subperiod. This leads to the following equilibrium conditions for all t:
1. Given φt, and the conditional distributions F and G; Vit(mi) and Wit(mi) satisfy
(2) and (3).
2. qit(mi, m˜) and dit(mi, m˜) maximize (5) in the day market.
3. φt > 0, which guarantees a monetary equilibria.
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4. Night money market clears, that is,
I∑
i
miGit(mi) = M . Walra's law guarantees
that the goods market also clears.
5. {Fit, Git} are consistent with the initial conditions and evolution of money hold-
ings from both day and night markets.
2.3 Solving the Model
In this part, I will present the general solution to the model without assuming most
parameter values or functional forms. In order to simplify the solution to this model
without loosing its' generality, let's assume that there are no double coincidence meet-
ings, that is, δ = 0. The approach to solve the model will follow the same steps as in
Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin (2005).
Starting with the centralized market, for each agent i, we can solve equation 4 for
Hi and substitute it into equation 3 to obtain,
Wit(mi) = max
Xi,m′i
(1− γi)κU(Xi)−Xi + φt(mi + τ)− φtm′i + βVit+1(m′i). (7)
The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to Xi and m
′
i are given by,
U ′(Xi) =
1
κ(1− γi) (8)
and
βV ′it+1(m
′
i) = φt. (9)
The solution to these two equations plus the budget constraint completely solves
the consumer problem in the centralized market. It is important to notice here that the
solution to Hi requires more work than in LW(2005). In their model X
∗ = H∗, since
average money holdings equals M . In this model the average money holdings an agent
i exiting the decentralized market carries is m¯i = (1 − σ)mi + σM . Hence it's steady
state budget constraint in equilibrium becomes H∗i = X∗− φ(σ+ ρ)(M −mi), where I
have used the fact that m′i = (1 + ρ)mi and τ = ρM . Also, since M =
∑I
i miGit(mi),
in order to completely solve the model one needs to assume some distribution of money
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holdings across agents.
The price of money φt can be obtained from the money market clearing condition.
Also notice that the choice of m′i is independent of mi, which suggests that the dis-
tribution of money holdings conditional on i type is degenerate. That is, every agent
with the same type enters the decentralized market holding exactly the same amount
of money m′i.
Starting in the decentralized market, ﬁrst we need to solve the terms of trade prob-
lem given by equation 5. From what we know about Wi, it is easy to check that
Wit(mi + di)−Wit(mi) = φtdi, which reduces 5 to:
max
di,qi
[γiu(qi)− φtdi]θ[−c(qi) + φtdi]1−θ (10)
subject to di ≤ mi.
Lagos and Wright (2005) have shown that the only feasible equilibrium is when
di = mi and the solution for qi can be obtained from the following ﬁrst order condition:
φtmi =
γi[(1− θ)u(qi)c′(qi) + θc(qi)u′(qi)]
γiθu′(qi) + (1− θ)c′(qi) . (11)
Let z(qi) ≡ γi[(1−θ)u(qi)c
′(qi)+θc(qi)u′(qi)]
γiθu′(qi)+(1−θ)c′(qi) , we have therefore that qi = qi(mi) is the solution
to
miφt = z(qi). (12)
Note that the solution to the terms of trade problem only depends on the buyer's money
holdings and not the seller's.
Now we can combine what we know about the terms of trade solution and Wi(mi)
and rewrite the value function in the decentralized market as:
Vit(mi) = ασ[γiu[qit(mi)] +Wit[mi − dit(mi)]] +
ασ
∫
−c[qit(m˜)] +Wit[mi + dit(m˜)]dFit(m˜) + (1− 2ασ)Wit(mi), (13)
assuming no double coincidence meetings. Diﬀerentiating the above expression with
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respect to mi noting that W
′
it(mi) = φt for all mi, we obtain
V ′it(mi) = ασγiu
′[qit(mi)]q′it(mi) + [1− ασd′it(mi)]φt. (14)
The above expression only depends on the buyer's money holdings and type. From the
terms of trade problem we have that d′it(mi) = 1 and
q′i(mi) =
φt
z′i(qi)
, (15)
by implicit diﬀerentiation. Substituting these expressions into equation 14 and using
equation 12 we obtain the following expression:
φt = β{ασγiu′(qit+1) φt+1
z′it+1(qit+1)
+ (1− ασ)φt+1}. (16)
In steady state this expression reduces to:
1 + ρ = β{ασγiu
′(qi)
z′(qi)
+ (1− ασ)}, (17)
where qi is constant and φt = (1 + ρ)φt+1. We can further simplify equation 17 by
deﬁning β ≡ 11+r and deﬁning a nominal interest rate (1+R) as (1+R) = (1+r)(1+ρ),
hence equation 17 becomes,
1 +
R
ασ
=
γiu
′(qi)
z′(qi)
. (18)
In order to explicitly solve this model, I will assume, following LW(2005), that
u(q) = (q+b)
(1−η)
1−η − b
(1−η)
1−η for any agent type. This utility form guarantees that u(0) = 0;
where b was chosen to be a very small number making no change in the model's solution.
I will also assume that c(q) = q and U(X) = lnX for every type.
3 Data
The data used for calibration purposes in this paper was taken from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX) for the second quarter of 1996; the data set consists of 3447
observations. Since this data set brings individual expenditure and income information,
I will use some of it's features to calibrate γi and κ for diﬀerent agent types. For the
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purposes of tractability, I will assume that there are 10 types of agents in this model.
They will diﬀer with respect to their expenditure shares on cash goods, that is, each
agent type corresponds to a diﬀerent cohort in the expenditure share distribution.
In order to deﬁne which agent belongs to which cohort, I separated each cohort by
expenditure shares on cash goods deciles. This assumption forces each cohort to have
the same number of individuals. That is, the ﬁrst cohort will constitute of all agents
in the bottom 10% of the expenditure share distribution; cohort 2 will constitute of
agents between the 10th and 20th percentile in the expenditure share distribution, all
subsequent cohorts will follow the same pattern making the last cohort of all agents
between the 90th and 100th percentiles. My model will be calibrated to match the
median expenditure share on cash goods of each cohort.
In order to achieve this, I need to assume the type of goods that can be considered
cash goods. The list of chosen goods was given by: food consumed at and away from
home, alcoholic beverages, apparel, gas and motor oil, prescription drugs, fees and
admissions to entertainment events, tobacco and smoking supplies, personal care items,
and cash contributions. These are the goods that agents consume in the day market.
Let ESDi be the median expenditure share on cash goods across agent type i found in
the data, that is, ESDi is the agent located at the 50th percentile expenditure share
within each cohort. The use of the median as my measure of center is to guarantee
that the measure of the expenditure share on cash goods by each cohort will not be
sensitive to any particular observation. However, the use of the average expenditure
share would not change the results for this particular data set. Table 1 has the average
and median expenditure shares by cohort; one can verify that both measures are very
similar across every cohort.
Table 1 also has information on the second data feature my model will attempt to
match, that is, average total expenditure per type (TEDi ). The last column of table
1 has the average total expenditure per type relative to type 1 agent (TERDi ). It is
quite obvious that there is a negative correlation between expenditure share on cash
goods and total expenditure, in fact this correlation is equal to -0.85. Figure 1 shows
this relationship.
The reason why this model will be calibrated to also match total expenditure is
because the data suggests that total expenditure and income are correlated. Figure
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2 plots total expenditure and after tax income for the average individual type. The
correlation coeﬃcient was calculated to be 0.79. By matching the model's solution to
total expenditure, I can make some claims about how inﬂation aﬀects diﬀerent income
individuals. This will allow me to compare my model with other studies, such as
Erosa and Ventura (2002), that have investigated this relationship. These correlations
suggests that poorer individuals consume cash goods in a larger fraction, in fact the
correlation coeﬃcient between expenditure shares and after tax income was calculated
to be -0.98. This result is in line with Avery et al. (1987), where they found that
high income individuals use a smaller fraction of their transactions on cash goods when
compared to lower income individuals.
Also, for comparison purposes, I have calculated the average expenditure share for
the entire sample. This aggregated value equals 0.32. Since my model will match
each agent's type expenditure share, it will also match the aggregated value. I will
use this feature to compare the results of my model to the results in LW(2005), where
the expenditure share on cash goods is much lower ranging from about 0.06 to 0.15.
The following section will explain the methodology I used to calibrate the model's
parameters in detail.
4 Calibration
The list of calibrated parameters is given by: ρ, σ, δ, α, θ, β, η, κ and γi. Table 2 has
the calibrated values. The values of α and δ were chosen as to simplify the model. The
parameter α equaling 1 implies that every individual i will have a meeting in the day
market, that is, the probability of having such meeting is a sure event. The parameter
δ was set to 0 to eliminate double coincidence meetings. The value of β = 0.99 was
chosen to match most studies that have calibrated this parameter for quarterly data.
The inﬂation rate ρ was calibrated to 0.01, which matches 1996 second quarter
inﬂation measured by the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all
urban consumers on all items. The bargaining parameter θ was set to 1 as to eliminate
the holdup problem where each buyer makes a take it or leave it oﬀer in the day market,
which maximizes the buyer's bargaining power; and 0.5 to capture the holdup problem.
Two values were chosen when calibrating σ: 0.3 and 0.5. Since σ is the probability
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of a single coincidence meeting, by setting σ = 0.5, we are maximizing the number of
successful meetings in the day market. This corresponds to having always an agreement
between parties. However, LW(2005) estimated σ using U.S. aggregate data to be 0.3,
therefore, for the purposes of checking the sensibility of the results with respect to
this parameter, the value of 0.3 was also used. It is important to notice that a σ
value of less than 0.5 indicates more friction in the day market, since individuals might
not encounter a successful trade. This could potentially increase the welfare costs of
inﬂation. I will use the values of θ = 1 and σ = 0.5 as my baseline model; all other 3
possible combinations of θ and σ will constitute the diﬀerent speciﬁcations also used.
Finally, η was calibrated to 0.25. I chose this value as an approximation to the range
of values LW(2005) used for this parameter. Since in their paper η varies between 0.15
to 0.5, I chose 0.25 and performed sensitivity analysis.
4.1 Calibrating γi and κ
Let's deﬁne ESMi as agent's i expenditure share on the day market good obtained from
the model, that is, the percentage of qi(γi) consumption relative to qi(γi)+X∗i (γi). The
expression for ESMi is therefore given by:
ESMi =
σq∗i (γi)
σq∗i (γi) +X∗i (γi)
(19)
for i = 1, 2, ..., 10; where X∗i = κ(1 − γi). Note that in the equation above q∗i (γi) is
being multiplied by σ. The reason for this is that since σ represents the probability
of a successful single coincidence meeting, (1− σ) is the probability of an unsuccessful
meeting, and whenever this happens q∗i (γi) = 0. Hence the numerator in the ESMi
equation should only have the term σq∗i (γi). The same reasoning explains the expression
in the denominator. Also deﬁne TEMi as agent's i total expenditure obtained from the
model, and TERMi as the ratio of TE
M
i relative to agent's 1 total expenditure, that is,
TERMi =
TEMi
TEM1
. (20)
Note that TEMi = σq
∗
i (γi) + κ(1 − γi), which is the denominator in the ESMi
equation. The parameters γi were chosen as to make ES
M
i = ES
D
i for every i. The
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scale parameter κ was calibrated as to minimize the sum of (TERMi − TERDi )2. The
solution to these parameters constitutes a system of 11 equations for eleven unknowns.
In order to solve this system, one needs to ﬁnd the solution for q∗i as a function of γi.
Whenever θ = 1, q∗i (γi) has a closed form solution, however, for θ < 1, q∗i (γi) needs
to be solved numerically. I have also used numerical methods to solve this system, as
none of the equations have closed form solutions3.
Table 3 has the calibrated values of γi and κ. Column 1 has the calibrated values for
the baseline model, whereas columns 2 to 4 presents the values of all other speciﬁcations
of the model. Note that κ varies as we change the set of calibrated parameters in the
model, this is because as θ and σ changes, the solution to q∗i changes and therefore
TERMi changes for every γi. The parameter κ compensates for these eﬀects; γi stays
very stable for diﬀerent combinations of σ and θ, however small diﬀerences in γi generate
quite large diﬀerences in 1−γi. Both of these eﬀects aﬀect the solution to X∗i . Also, γi
increases with agent type which implies that agents who spend a higher percentage of
their expenditures on cash goods prefer these goods more relative to the general good.
Figures 3 and 4 plot expenditure shares and total expenditure ratios from the data
against the expenditure shares and total expenditure ratios found in the model for all
diﬀerent combinations of θ and σ. Both ﬁgures show that, for all possible combinations
of θ and σ, the model generates expenditure shares and total expenditures very similar
to what is found in the data. In fact, aside from rounding errors due to the numerical
procedures, this model matches expenditure shares exactly since γi was obtained from
setting ESMi −ESDi = 0, given κ, for all i. Even though, total expenditure ratios from
the model does not match exactly the total expenditure ratio found in the data, ﬁgure
5 shows that, for all calibrated values of κ corresponding to diﬀerent combinations of
θ and σ, the model performs quite well. The reason why total expenditure ratios did
not match the data exactly is that in the minimization procedure, κ did not produce
the sum of squared deviations to be exactly zero.
The importance of having the parameter κ in the model is that it guarantees that
poorer agent's measured by their total expenditure are the ones with higher expenditure
shares on cash goods. Figure 5 plots total expenditure ratios obtained from data, the
baseline model for κ = 1, as well as κ = 1 and θ = 0.5. Compared to the data, it
3The methods used to calibrate γi and κ were the bisection method and simulated annealing respectively.
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obviously performs quite poorly on the quantitative level.
5 Results
In this section, I will present the solutions and welfare costs of inﬂation for the baseline
model and compare it to all other speciﬁcations. Using the calibrated parameters
mentioned above, table 4 has the solution to q∗i , X∗i , and H∗i for all i and diﬀerent
combinations of θ and σ. Columns 1, 2, and 3 have the solutions for the baseline
model. Note that as expenditure shares on cash goods increase (moving from agent 1
to agent 10), willingness to work decreases in the centralized market.
The solutions to q∗i , regardless of θ and σ, show a positive correlation with ex-
penditure share. That is, as expenditure share on cash goods increase, so does the
consumption of that good. This feature is found to be true in the data in general.
The opposite is true with respect to the solution to X∗i as mentioned above. There is
a negative correlation between the consumption of the general good and expenditure
share on cash goods. Data suggests that this should be the case. Figure 6 plots total
expenditure on cash goods, and total expenditures on the general good by agent type
for the data. Total expenditure on the general good is deﬁnitely decreasing, while total
expenditure on cash goods is increasing.
Figures 7 and 8 compare the solutions to q∗i and X∗i , for diﬀerent combinations of
θ and σ, with data. Note that in those ﬁgures, I am plotting q∗i and X∗i relative to q∗1
and X∗1 respectively. I have also performed the same calculations for the data values.
The model captures the overall trend in total expenditures on cash goods, regardless
of the speciﬁcation, even though, it does not match the data exactly. However, the
model matches the data with respect to the consumption of the general good for all
speciﬁcations. Overall, the model performs well when compared to the data.
Comparing the results from table 4, q∗i increases for larger values of σ and θ for
all i; this feature is consistent with Lagos and Wright (2004), where they have shown
that ∂q∂θ > 0 and
∂q
∂σ > 0. It is quite trivial to check that these eﬀects are also true
in my model. In the case of the bargaining parameter θ, the smaller it becomes the
smaller is the buyer's bargaining power, which results in a smaller surplus, decreasing
the buyer's incentive to purchase that good. The parameter σ is the probability of
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a single coincidence meeting, the smaller it becomes the harder it is to accomplish a
successful match. Hence, lower σ values should result in lower consumption of cash
goods. Since both of these parameters impose more frictions in the market for cash
goods and since their eﬀect on q∗i is qualitatively the same, the consumption of cash
good will be the lowest whenever more frictions are imposed at the same time, that is,
θ = 0.5 and σ = 0.3. In order to capture which friction aﬀects q∗ the most, we can
compare the solutions to q∗i for two diﬀerent combinations of the parameters θ and σ:
θ = 1, σ = 0.3, and θ = 0.5, σ = 0.5. The ﬁrst combination imposes a larger friction
on ﬁnding a bargaining partner and no friction in the terms of trade; once a partner
has been found, the buyer has all the bargaining power and makes a take-it or leave-it
oﬀer to the seller. The second combination imposes the minimum friction on ﬁnding
a partner, but creates a friction on the bargaining for the buyer. With θ = 0.5, the
seller is able to bargain some of the surplus way from the buyer, reducing the buyer's
incentive to bring cash to the market. The solution to q∗i is smaller whenever the
bargaining friction is imposed for all i compared to the solution where the meeting
friction is imposed. In fact, q∗i is in general smaller for smaller values of θ regardless of
the value assigned to σ. This result suggests that the holdup eﬀect is stronger relative
to the single coincidence meeting probability.
Another interesting feature of the solution is the relationship between X∗i , H∗i , and
money holdings across agents. For any agent i, whenever X∗i > H∗i implies that actual
money holdings are smaller than average money holdings for the average type i agent,
for given φ, σ, and ρ. This result can be derived from the agent's budget constraint
in the night market. Also, since the agent is consuming more than it produces, it has
to use cash to purchase what is left, hence it uses some of the government transfer to
accomplish that. This implies that these agents take less thanm+τ to the decentralized
market. The opposite is true for the case where X∗i < H∗i . Hence q∗i should increase
as H∗i becomes larger than X∗i . Table 4 shows that agent types 1, 2, 3, and 4 work
less than the amount they consume in the centralized market; this situation is reversed
for agents type 5 through 10. Also, the diﬀerence between H∗i and X∗i increases as we
move from agent 1 to agent 10, that is, H∗10 −X∗10 > H∗9 −X∗9 > ... > H∗1 −X∗1 . This
explains why q∗i increases with agent type.
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5.1 Welfare Cost of Inﬂation
In this section, the solution to the model will be analyzed with respect to the agent's
welfare as we change the inﬂation rate. Since agent's i utility form is quasi-linear, the
welfare cost of inﬂation calculation becomes quite simple, since consumer surplus can
just be measured as the diﬀerence in welfare functions when reducing inﬂation from x%
to zero. That is, let Y ∗i be the steady state welfare function of agent i. Then Y ∗i can
be written as,
(1− β)Y ∗i (ρ) = ασ[γiu(q∗i (ρ))− c(q∗i (ρ))] + κ(1− γi)U(X∗i )−H∗i (ρ) (21)
for any inﬂation rate ρ.
Letting ∆ be the fraction of consumption that agent i is willing to forgive in order
to maintain the same level of welfare and reduce inﬂation from some positive value to
zero, we have:
(1− β)Y ∗i (0) = ασ[γiu(q∗i (0)∆)− c(q∗i (0))] + κ(1− γi)U(X∗i ∆)−H∗i (0) (22)
The welfare cost of inﬂation will be the value 1 − ∆ obtained from subtracting
equation (22) from (21) and setting the diﬀerence equal to zero. Table 5 brings the
results in percentage form. Column 1 has the results for the baseline model. Each
number on the table corresponds to the percentage amount of consumption forgone that
a consumer would allow in order to have inﬂation reduced from 10% to zero. Figure 9
plots the results from table 5 for every speciﬁcation as to make the visualization better.
Note that for the baseline model, the welfare cost of inﬂation ranges between 0.974%
and 2.687% and is monotonically increasing. This implies that the poorest 10% can
suﬀer 2.76 times more than the richest 10%. Without a doubt, the regressiveness of the
inﬂation tax is present in this model.
Table 5 also shows that the holdup problem acts as a magniﬁer with respect to
the welfare cost of inﬂation. As in LW(2005), by introducing the holdup problem, the
welfare cost of inﬂation is larger given any agent type. Since in this paper agents diﬀer
with respect to their total expenditures, it is reasonable to ask if the holdup eﬀect also
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varies with agent type, that is, is the holdup eﬀect diﬀerent for diﬀerent individuals?
The answer is: most certainly.
Figure 10 plots the diﬀerence in welfare cost of inﬂation, obtained in from table
5, for each agent type between holdup and no holdup. In both cases, regardless of
the value of σ, one can detect an increasing relationship. That is, the holdup eﬀect is
stronger for individuals who spend a larger percentage of their earnings on cash goods.
The model suggests that while the holdup eﬀect is in the order of 3 percentages points
for agent type 1, this eﬀect increases to 8 or 11 percentage points, depending on σ, for
agent type 10. This result suggests that the holdup eﬀect increases the regressiveness
of the inﬂation tax.
As to make the welfare cost results more tractable, table 6 has the solution to the
diﬀerence between equations 22 and 21 piece by piece. This table shows that the driving
force behind the diﬀerences in welfare costs is the diﬀerence between the consumption
of cash goods and therefore the diﬀerence in utility between them. As the diﬀerence in
utilities increase, more needs to be taken away from consumption whenever inﬂation is
zero in order to have the equation hold; that is, as the diﬀerence in utility increases ∆
decreases. Note that the largest diﬀerence in utilities can be found for the case where
θ = 0.5 and σ = 0.3. This has to be true since the utility function is concave, and
optimal q decreases with lower values of θ and σ. Hence, the curvature of the utility
function should matter for the welfare calculations. Figures 11 and 12 has welfare
cost results for diﬀerent η values; recall that η measures the degree of risk averseness.
In all cases the results remain the same with small changes in welfare costs for given
agent types. It appears, therefore, that the results are not sensible to η values in the
neighborhood of 0.25.
One last remark on table 6 is that the diﬀerences in hours worked at night are similar
across agents, however, it is negative for agents 1 to 4, and positive otherwise. Overall,
this diﬀerence is increasing on agent type. That is, inﬂation creates an disincentive to
work on poorer individuals.
Since this model uses household data to establish a distribution of agent types
and calculates welfare cost of inﬂation for each type, comparing these results to other
studies is quite diﬃcult. However, it is possible to aggregate my results given the
assumed distribution of agents and calculate the welfare cost of inﬂation for this average
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individual. Table 7 has these results for the baseline model and one other speciﬁcation
with θ = 0.5 and σ = 0.5. I have also reproduced LW(2005) results for comparison
purposes.
The last two columns of table 7 brings the expenditure share and welfare cost of in-
ﬂation for the average individual in the model. With no holdup, the average individual
will forgo 1.8% of consumption; this result is somewhat in line with other studies. How-
ever, when the holdup eﬀect is introduced, the cost increases to 6.8% of consumption,
a much larger value even compared to LW(2005). One possible explanation for this
discrepancy is that the average agent in this model consumes a much larger share of
the cash good compared to LW(2005). Attempting to resolve this problem, I calculated
the welfare cost for an atomistic agent in my model matching it's expenditure share to
that of LW(2005). Since LW(2005) use two diﬀerent time frames in their calculations,
their expenditure shares change by a small amount. Hence, for comparison purposes
I picked the average of those two numbers when calculating the welfare cost for the
atomistic agent. It is quite clear that, the welfare results from this new calculation are
very similar to that of LW(2005). This suggests that this model is in line with most
studies at the aggregate level, making the results at the disagregated level more robust.
In order to check if the regressiveness of the inﬂation tax in this model is solely a
function of my choice of cash goods basket, I performed welfare cost calculations for
a diﬀerent basket of cash goods. As a conservative measurement, I only used food
consumption as cash goods. Table 8 and ﬁgure 14 presents these results. It is quite
noticeable that even though the results diﬀer in absolute terms, the relativity of them
was preserved. This is very important, since no one knows exactly which goods are
purchased with cash,and therefore any welfare cost calculation will be inﬂuenced by
this assumption, however, this paper shows that regardless of your choice, it is possible
to assess the cost in relative terms.
6 Conclusion
This paper calibrated a simple monetary search model to U.S. household expenditure
data and calculated the welfare cost of 10% inﬂation for diﬀerent individual types
grouped by expenditure share on cash goods deciles. These individuals varied with re-
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spect to the degree they preferred cash goods over the general good. The main ﬁndings
of this exercise, in line with other studies, were that: ﬁrst, inﬂation acts as a regres-
sive consumption tax since individuals with smaller total expenditure and therefore
less earnings suﬀer more with inﬂation than individuals with higher total expenditure.
Second, the introduction of the holdup problem generates higher relative welfare costs,
augmenting; therefore, the regressiveness of the inﬂation tax.
The main contribution of this paper was to combine two known results from the
literature - inﬂation is regressive and holdup increases it's cost - in a deep, but simple,
model of money with micro foundations. The simplicity of this model makes it useful
for applications to diﬀerent data sets as well as diﬀerent countries.
Hence, some interesting extensions to this work would be to apply this model to
developing countries who have experienced periods of large inﬂation. In these coun-
tries, poorer individuals use cash for almost every purchase with very little bargaining
power; hence inﬂation could potentially be relatively more harmful to these individuals
compared to the wealthier. Also, one could introduce a competing media of exchange
in the model in the form of a credit good, where only a fraction of the population have
access to it at some cost. This good would protect individuals against inﬂation, making
it's cost smaller relative to the fraction of the population that does not have access to
credit. This scenario is probably applicable to most countries in the world, but specially
poorer countries with high degrees of inequality.
Lastly, one could introduce heterogeneity in the labor productivity in the centralized
market together with preference heterogeneity. This feature could match the results
from this paper, however, it would provide us with better insights with respect to labor
decisions under inﬂation. The current paper displays diﬀerent labor choices as inﬂation
changes, however, workers are paid the same, which might not be the best assumption,
since diﬀerences in wage rates could potentially provide some explanation, other than
preferences, for how much people decide to work.
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A Tables
Table 1: Data Summary by Agent Types
Agent Type Rel. Freq Average ES Median ESD Average TED ($) TERD
1 0.1 0.127 0.136 16125 1
2 0.1 0.20 0.203 9262 0.574
3 0.1 0.241 0.242 8782 0.544
4 0.1 0.274 0.273 7788 0.483
5 0.1 0.303 0.303 7469 0.463
6 0.1 0.332 0.332 7060 0.438
7 0.1 0.364 0.363 6572 0.407
8 0.1 0.402 0.402 6220 0.386
9 0.1 0.452 0.450 5571 0.345
10 0.1 0.563 0.547 4702 0.292
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Table 2: Calibrated Values of Model Parameters
Parameter Value
σ 0.3 and 0.5
α 1
δ 0
β 0.99
θ 0.5 and 1
η 0.25
κ chosen to minimize
∑10
i=1(TER
M
i − TERDi )2
γ chosen to match ESDi
Table 3: Calibrated Values of γ and κ
β = 0.99 η = 0.25
σ = 0.5 σ = 0.3
θ = 1 θ = 0.5 θ = 1 θ = 0.5
κ 200.37 173.39 88.84 66.02
γ1 0.98706 0.98975 0.98438 0.98706
γ2 0.99194 0.99359 0.99023 0.99194
γ3 0.99353 0.99487 0.99207 0.99353
γ4 0.99451 0.99561 0.99329 0.99451
γ5 0.99518 0.99619 0.99414 0.99517
γ6 0.99579 0.99667 0.99487 0.99579
γ7 0.99634 0.9971 0.99554 0.99634
γ8 0.99687 0.99753 0.99619 0.99687
γ9 0.99742 0.99796 0.99686 0.99742
γ10 0.99825 0.99861 0.99786 0.99824
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Table 5: Welfare Costs of 10% Inﬂation, by Agent Type, Measured as the Per-
centage of Total Consumption Forgone
β = 0.99 η = 0.25
σ = 0.5 σ = 0.3
Agent Type θ = 1 θ = 0.5 θ = 1 θ = 0.5
1st 0.974 3.401 1.967 5.699
2nd 1.276 4.711 2.616 7.807
3rd 1.438 5.421 2.954 8.942
4th 1.572 5.965 3.262 9.863
5th 1.698 6.520 3.521 10.592
6th 1.812 7.011 3.772 11.361
7th 1.957 7.560 4.070 12.221
8th 2.115 8.208 4.388 13.194
9th 2.317 8.987 4.793 14.316
10th 2.687 10.522 5.641 16.561
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Table 7: Expenditure Shares and the Welfare Costs of 10% Inﬂation Comparisons
with σ = 0.5
LW(2005) Atomistic Agent Average Agent
1900-2000 1959-2000
ES 1-∆ ES 1-∆ ES 1-∆ ES 1-∆
no holdup (θ = 1) 0.12 0.014 0.10 0.008 0.11 0.009 0.32 0.018
holdup (θ = 0.5) 0.09 0.032 0.06 0.025 0.075 0.022 0.32 0.068
Table 8: Welfare Cost of 10% Inﬂation using Food as the only Cash Good with
σ = 0.5
θ = 1, κ = 130 θ = 0.5, κ = 80
Agent Type γ (1-∆)*100 γ (1-∆)*100
1 0.9589 0.663 0.9550 2.154
2 0.9731 0.751 0.9702 2.685
3 0.9785 0.815 0.9760 3.014
4 0.9816 0.859 0.9799 3.340
5 0.9843 0.914 0.9826 3.628
6 0.9863 0.958 0.9848 3.909
7 0.9880 1.000 0.9868 4.195
8 0.9898 1.072 0.9888 4.638
9 0.9918 1.155 0.9909 5.156
10 0.9944 1.348 0.9939 6.263
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B Figures
Figure 1: Expenditure Share on Cash Goods and Total Expenditure Ratios by
Agent Types
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Figure 2: Relationship between Total Expenditure and After Tax Income by
Agent Types
Figure 3: Comparison between Expenditure Shares on cash Goods from the
Model with Data
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Figure 4: Comparison between Total Expenditure Ratios from the Model with
Data
Figure 5: Sensitivity Check of Total Expenditure Ratios with κ = 1
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Figure 6: Total Expenditure on Cash and General Goods from Data by Agent
Type
Figure 7: Total Expenditure on Cash and General Goods from Data compared
to Model by Agent Type
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Figure 8: Total Expenditure on Cash and General Goods from Data compared
to Model by Agent Type
Figure 9: Welfare Costs of 10% Inﬂation by Agent Type
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Figure 10: Holdup Eﬀect Measured as the Diﬀerence in Welfare Cost of 10%
Inﬂation
Figure 11: Welfare Costs of 10% Inﬂation for diﬀerent η values with θ = 1, σ = 0.5
by Agent Type
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Figure 12: Welfare Costs of 10% Inﬂation for diﬀerent η values with θ = 0.5,
σ = 0.5 by Agent Type
Figure 13: Comparing Welfare Costs of 10% Inﬂation for diﬀerent Basket of Cash
Goods with σ = 0.5 by Agent Type
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